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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAll

ROBERT E. CALL, EVERETT H.

CALL and ANN D•

CAL.t. ,

Plaintiffs and
Respondents ,

vs.
'?IMBER LAKES CORPORATION,

)

a Utah Corporation,
)

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF
Appeal from the District r'"n~h
Judicial District In and For Wasatdi~·
Honorable J. Robert

* • * * * * * * • •

* *

ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON

John S • Adams
Suite 200, The Glass Factory
&¥row Press Square
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT E. CALL, EVERETT H.
CALL and ANN D. CALL,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

Case No. 14839

vs.
TIMBER LAKES CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Respondents for a Declaratory
Judgment declaring a certain contract for sale of real
property, dated November 6, 1971, by and between the parties,
to be in full force and effect and adjudicating the respective
rights and duties of the parties under and pursuant to the
provisions of said contract.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
A nonjury trial was held in the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District in and for Wasatch County, State of
Utah before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock.

Pursuant to his
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (set out in more
detail in Appellant's Statement of Facts), Judge Bullock
entered a Memorandum Decision reinstating the contract upon
payment by Respondents to Appellant of all delinquent payments and accrued interest together with costs (not attorney's
fees) within fifteen days from the date of judgment.
This appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah pursuant to Rule 72 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask this Court to affirm the judgment of
the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents accept generally the facts set forth
in Appellant's brief with the following minor additions.
Although there is a conflict in the testimony, i t is the
position of the Respondents that prior to termination of
the ten day notice furnished them by letter of December

121

· rs of
1974, they did, in fact, contact responsible o ff ice
(see transcript
Appellant company in response to such notice.
It is noted further
of trial, page 14, lines 19 through 27.)
741 and
·
that the time between t h e notice
o f December 10' 19
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the offer of payment by the Respondents was, in fact, twentytwo rather than twenty-three days as set forth in Appellant's
statement.
ARGUMENT
UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE THE
TEN DAYS SPECIFIED IN THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 12,
1974, IN WHICH THE CONTRACT WAS TO BE BROUGHT
CURRENT WAS NOT A REASONABLE TIME AND TWENTY-TWO
DAYS WAS NOT AN UNREASONABLE TIME FOR RESPONDENTS
TO TENDER PERFORMANCE AFTER NOTICE.
The cases cited by Appellant represent those cases which
most strongly present and represent its position.

Included

are cases which speak of a so-called waiver of rights by
the Seller and the need for notice after delinquencies.
With these we have no quarrel.

But the two cases in fact

relied upon by Appellant to state its case are Pacific
Development Company vs. Stewart, 113 u. 403, 195 P. 2d 748
(1948) and Fullmer vs. Blood
606 (1976) •

U. 2d ~~~~' 546

P. 2d

In those cases the court upheld the right of the

Seller to terminate the interest of the Buyer under facts
and upon conditions which the court found to be reasonable
under all the circumstances.

As suggested by Appellant's

brief, "each case must be considered on its own facts and
what may be reasonable time in one case may not be reasonable
in another" .

-

3 -
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Both of Appellant's cases may be rea d'l
i y d'is tinguished fr:·
the one here to be decided.
We look first at Pacific Development Company vs. Ste·:
supra.

Notwithstanding the extensive quotations from thi:

case used by the Appellant in support of its ccntentions,
the real holding of the case is this:
We hold that twenty-three days was
reasonable time to allow Defendant
make up the overdue payments under
circumstances of this case.
(Page

a
to
the
751)

The significant and controlling difference between
Pacific Development Company vs. Stewart, supra, and the
present case is simple.

In Pacific, the Sellers were give:.

a right to foreclose because they had given the Buyers
twenty-three days to pay the delinquency and the Buyers he
not done so.

In our case, the Buyers tendered the full

delinquency within twenty-two days (twelve days past the
deadline)

and the tender was refused by the Seller. It is

the testimony of Respondents that their tender of the fuli
delinquency was within the period approved by the Appellan:
Seller.

(See Transcript of Trial page 14, lines 19 throus"

30, page 15, full page, and page 16, lines 1 through

29 1
·

.
.
.
t certain
At trial there was conflicting testimony as 0
.
.
.
derstanding,
facts and dates, due to fabrication, misun
·
k e, or poor memories.
·
mista

Based upon thi's- conflicting

th e lower court found that there was no
.
testimony,
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representation, commitment, or agreement that the time for
bringing the contract current would be extended beyond
December 22, 1974.

More significantly for our purposes here,

however, the trial court did find that there was some contact
between the parties following the notice and prior to January
3, 1975.

(See paragraph 5 of Findings of Fact.}

Based

upon all the evidence and after sifting certain conflicting
testimony and appraising the demeanor of the witnesses,
Judge Bullock entered as paragraph 6 and 8 of his Findings
of Fact the following:
6.
On January 3, 1975, Plaintiffs
offered to then bring the contract current
by paying all delinquent payments and
accumulated interest and were ready and
able to do so, but such offer was refused
by the Defendant.

**********
8. Under all the circumstances of
this case, the ten days specified in the
letter of December 12, 1974, in which the
contract was to be brought current was
not a reasonable time and twenty-two days
was not an unreasonable time for Plaintiffs
to tender performance after notice.
As indicated by references to Transcript of Trial in the
Paragraph above at pages 14, 15, and 16 the testimony of
Respondents is clearly to the effect that in their minds at
least they were still negotiating this matter, both as to
time and amount, right up to the date they tendered payment

-

5 -
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of the delinquency, to-wit, January 3, 1975.

They were

not unaware or nor indifferent to the need to do somethin
1
to cure the delinquency.

They clearly wanted to retain

their interest in the con tract.

They were, however,

limited in this regard not only by their own circumstance:,
but by the actions of the Sellers.

It is true as argued

by Appellant that Respondents did not plead hardship as
a reason for their failure to make timely tender.

However,

the testimony of Respondents is that on the due date
given in the notice they asked for and received additional
time at the end of which period they tendered full payment
of the delinquency.

While testimonies differ as to the

dates and efforts, the fact is that the Respondents were
trying to and finally did tender payment within what the
court below considered under all the circumstances to have
been a reasonable period.
Next, in Appellant's case of Full.mer vs. Blood, supra,
in which Sellers were permitted to terminate the rights
of purchasers, note that it was nearly two months before
purchasers made any effort to comply with the Se
demand.

11 r's
e

· th'is case is
The language of the court in

significant:
We do not confront the specific
problem as to whether the giving of
five days notice to make the one
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yearly payment or suffer forfeiture
was a reasonable time.
The question
is whether it was a reasonable demand
under the terms 0£ the contract and
the total circumstances to which the
court looks in making that determination.
The facts are that Dean Fullmer wrote
the letter on March 26, 1974, requiring
that one annual payment be made within
five days .........•• and it was not until
nearly two months later on June 5, that
the Defendants made any effort to
comply with the demand by offering to
pay one annual payment.
This is in sharp contrast to the efforts of the Respondents
in the present case, whose testimony is that they tried to
contact Appellant the day before the deadline, did contact
Appellant the day of the deadline, received assurance that
they would have until January 3, to pay (again recognizing
the difference in the testimony as hereinabove referred to)
and on January 3, did, in fact, tender full payment of the
delinquency.

However

the conflicting evidence is viewed by

the Court and whichever witnesses the Court chooses to believe,
that is a far different set 0£ circumstances than those in
Fullmer vs. Blood, supra, where the Defendant made no effort
to comply for nearly two months.

As argued elsewhere in this

brief, the trial court heard the conflicting testimony and
determined that the efforts of Respondents were adequate to
insulate them against forfeiture.
The case of Fullmer vs. Blood, supra, also sets forth
What th 15

Court has called in another matter "the traditional
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rule of review"

(Jensen vs. Nielsen, 26 u. 2d 96 ,
P,
485

2d 673 (1971)).

At page 610 of Fullmer vs. Blood, the

Court said:
A suit of this nature involving the
invocation of the forfeiture and/or
the enforcement of a purchase contract
invokes consideration of the
principles of equity which address
themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant's brief at page 6 quotes First Security Bar.\
of Utah vs. Demiris,

10 U. 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 79, insupp:ir:

of its contentions that the Supreme· Court need not accept
the findings of the lower court, but has the prerogative
to modify or make new findings.

A reading of the first

half of the paragraph relied upon by Appellant rather than
just the second half of the said paragraph sets forth the
duty of the Supreme Court in such a matter:
It is to be recognized that in
reviewing the Findings of Fact, we
should indulge considerable latitude
to the findings of the trial court
and should not disturb them unless
the evidence clearly preponderates
to the contrary.
(Pages 98 and 99)
(Emphasis added.)

crande~
The Supreme Court h as sai"d si"mi"larly i·n re --Estate, 9

u.

2d 161, 340 P. 2d 760 (1959):

Accordingly it is the prerogat~ve
of this Court to review the evidence
upon which the said order was based.
Nevertheless, it is our declared
policy to indulge considerable
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latitude to the determination made
by the trial court, and not to
disturb his judgment unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against
it.
(Emphasis added. )
rt is respectfully submitted to this Court that in the
case at hand not only does the evidence not clearly preponderate
against the findings of the trial court, but rather clearly
supports such findings and judgment.
CONCLUSION
The lower court found that Respondents had paid approximately $3,181.00 on a $10,000.00 purchase of real property:
they had been delinquent on several occasions and had been
permitted by the Appellant to make up the payments.

On

December 12, 1974, they were served a ten-day notice as a
result of which they contacted and negotiated with Appellant
company and on Ja11uary 3, 1975, tendered full payments of
the delinquency.

Payment was refused by the Seller.

Recognizing that the law generally does not favor
forfeitures and under the settled principle that in reviewing
an equity matter, the Supreme court's declared policy is to
indulge considerable latitude to the determination made by
the trial court, Respondents respectfully request this Court
to affirm the findings of the lower court and to uphold its
judgment "that upon tender by Plaintiffs to the Defendant

- 9 -
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of delinquent payments and interest in the amount of
$4,832.59, plus costs by September 11, 1976, the contrac:
between the parties is ordered reinstated and in full
force and effect".
Respondents further pray for an award of reasonable
attorney's fees and costs expended in responding to the
appeal.
Dated this 24th day of February, 1977.

Respectfully submitted,

~L

RUSSELL C. HARRIS
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respo:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

...

""

I hereby certify that on the ---~-.;-~~day of February,
1977, two true and correct copies 0£ the foregoing Brief
were mailed, postage prepaid, to John S. Adams, Adams,
Kasting

&

_Anderson, Attorney for Appellant, Suite 200, The

Glass Factory, Arrow Press Square, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
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